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Abstract 
Why do we preserve? The thesis questions and explores an undoubted belief in the 
preservation of a material past. This founding heritage of conservation is traced back to 
the Victorian preoccupation with decay and its management during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Bringing the desire to life again in modern technologies, the 
sustainability of preservation is doubted. My contribution to conservation studies is to 
present the formation of conservation discourse in a cross-disciplinary light. 
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Introduction 
Background 
At a lecture at the Yale library in 2010, Helen Shenton, former Head of Collection Care at 
the British Library, summarized her seven-and-a-half-year experience of administrating 
the conservation and digitization of Codex Sinaiticus as:1 
So the preservation has changed, and the nature of what has been preserved 
changed. We still have the legacy of physical collections, and the digitization has 
become a lot more sophisticated. [...] Now we can use advanced technology to make 
rare objects that can be more authentic than the authentic fragments. So coming full 
circle to my first paradox about the preservation being about the future, more than 
the past. With this futuristic venture, we can be more true to the past.2 
She is not alone in predicting that digital technology will have significant influences – in 
either, or both, optimistic or pessimistic ways – on conservation by means of introducing a 
new materiality, a new set of definitions: conservation problems and techniques to deal 
with past and present problems. 3 Yet such anticipation of change, envisioned as “crossing 
the pond” by Shenton in the lecture, is not limited to areas that have been actively engaged 
in digitization and digital preservation. 4  
The diagnosis that conservation as such – as we now know and practice it – has reached a 
“juncture of impasses,”5 where it calls for a revision, a self-analysis or re-organization of 
some of the core concepts of conservation, has been continuously voiced out elsewhere the 
last two decades; be it diagnosing the dilemma between preservation and access, the 
conflict between ethics and practice, the gap between materiality and immateriality, the 
problem of authenticity, or the untenability of principles of minimal intervention and 
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reversibility, they all communicate that there is something within conservation that needs 
to be overcome or bridged.6 Thus the most prominent undercurrents in Shenton’s 
statement are that she first tries to project the epistemological impossibility that 
preservation, in itself, cannot be for the future and the past simultaneously, and that the 
pressure of authenticity, of being true to the past, exacerbates this apartness.7 
Is digital technology, then, with its new materiality, an added symptom to the existing 
ailments of conservation, or a way to steer the entire course of conservation away from its 
woes? Can technology have a determining effect on our engagement with things and thus 
change our conception and practice of conservation - its objects, aims and techniques? 
Shenton seems to suggest the latter; digital technology will not only help us overcome the 
temporal divide between the future and the past, but also help us be more true to the past. 
These are tempting propositions to work with, but an inherent trap in them is the alluring 
optimism or pessimism inherent in any technological determinism. It may seductively 
gloss over the perseverance of the same problems. The urge to digitize may simply try to 
embrace a brand new byte order to divert from these muddled discomforts.  
Instead of taking the current problems at face value and venturing into the same pixelated 
future, made transparent and invisible on the new high-resolution retina screens, for a 
cure, this thesis takes a cue from the expression “juncture of impasses” that 
simultaneously evokes the spatial and temporal exigencies of conservation that it 
succinctly tries to reach in a deceptively simple question: how has conservation arrived at 
where it is now? By expressing it in this manner, I do not mean to evoke a, or rather the, 
history of conservation – i.e. a coherent, authoritative narrative leading up to the current 
state. It is not an etiology, a narrative of the origin,8 but rather a diagnosis, an 
interpretation of symptoms and mechanisms, that I am interested in. I will observe and 
analyze how important concepts such as authenticity, physical integrity and, most central 
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to this thesis, preservation are made sense of or communicated to us in conservation 
through negotiations and technologies that arrive at those, already mentioned, impassable 
junctures between the past and the future.9 In other words, it is the diagnosis of the 
exigencies of conservation by means of an analysis of the formation of conservation 
discourse that is the main thesis.  
Method 
As a methodology, a diagnosis requires looking at and describing the symptoms as they 
appear. By doing so, it simultaneously addresses and examines the problems in a closed 
system of interpretation. Take, as an example to better circumscribe the method, the 
immanent intelligibility of sexuality in Freud’s interpretation of the enactments of sexual 
fantasies by hysterical women, as recognized by Michel Foucault:10 
Sexuality was not something hidden behind or underneath the performances that the 
good doctors were staging. Freud's discovery, his breakthrough, was not the sexual 
dimension per se; Charcot had already discovered that. Freud's originality was to 
take these performances seriously and symbolically. He saw that they had to be 
interpreted as to their sense. Hence we get “The Interpretation of Dreams” which, 
as Foucault says, is something very different from an etiology of neurosis. Put 
schematically, Charcot was searching for the objective cause of these actions; Freud 
saw that the actor's hidden intentions had to be interpreted if we were to understand 
what was going on.11 
In Foucault’s account, this immanence of the intelligibility of any given knowledge – e.g. 
sexuality – in a discourse is the power being in play; thus, “we cannot have knowledge 
about sexuality without power being in play.”12 The power, here, is not to be confused 
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with an agency or structure of power that deliberately produces an imposed sexuality from 
above. A strict history/historicism of sexuality might imply and even attempt to locate 
such an agency. Foucault’s notion of power is best understood as a sphere of force that is 
constituted from below, and is equivalent to strategies which produce, interrelate and 
legitimize accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understanding and, inevitably, arrive at 
truth: 
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere. [...] Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a 
certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex 
strategical situation in a particular society.13 
Foucault’s pivotal term power/knowledge14 thus signifies the inter-relatedness of power 
and knowledge: “knowledge is both the creator of power and creation of power.”15 In this 
light, the role of discourse is to transmit and produce power, as “both an instrument and an 
effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point 
for an opposing strategy.”16 What is important here, for my purpose of analyzing the 
formation of conservation, is the way discourse operates: the way power is transmitted 
through language and practices, and the way language is related to power.17 Hollway et. al. 
illustrate these operating rules of discourse and the formation process of discourse in an 
example from biology: 
In practice, discourses delimit what can be said, whilst providing the spaces – the 
concepts, metaphors, models, analogies – for making new statements within any 
specific discourse. For example, concepts and developments in biology provided 
some of the key models and metaphors about the human organism and population 
which the discourses of mental measurement and of cognitive development, as in 
9 
 
Piaget, utilized in the production of their propositions and findings. Furthermore, 
the latter had to be consistent with the models used. Equally, the further elaboration 
of genetics from the 1920s made possible a recasting of the explanations of 
differences in the performance of so-called cognitive tasks. The analysis which we 
propose regards every discourse as the result of a practice of production which is at 
once material, discursive and complex, always inscribed in relation to other 
practices of production of discourse. Every discourse is part of a discursive 
complex; it is locked in an intricate web of practices, bearing in mind that every 
practice is by definition both discursive and material.18 
Using a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis in my thesis, I will follow the five 
steps outlined by Kendall and Wickham: 
1. the recognition of a discourse as a corpus of 'statements' whose organization is 
regular and systematic. 
The subsequent steps cannot be taken until this one has been safely negotiated, for 
they relate to the fact that in being regular and systematic discourses have rules. 
These remaining four steps are steps of rule identification. They are: 
2. the identification of rules of the production of statements; 
3. the identification of rules that delimit the sayable (which of course are never rules 
of closure);  
4. the identification of rules that create the spaces in which new statements can be 
made;  
5. the identification of rules that ensure that a practice is material and discursive at 
the same time.19 
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What inevitably emerges in Foucauldian discourse analysis is the participatory aspect and 
position of the author/subject in relation to the discourse that she is analyzing.20 This is not 
unique, yet it has been a recurring subject of criticism in relation to a Foucauldian 
approach. But the pragmatic acceptance of one’s own voice is of course the precise 
boundary, as well as the expressive aim, of any interpretation: 
Interpretive understanding can only be obtained by someone who shares the actor's 
involvement, but distances himself from it. This person must undertake the hard 
historical work of diagnosing and analyzing the history and organization of current 
cultural practices. The resulting interpretation is a pragmatically guided reading of 
the coherence of the practices of the society. It does not claim to correspond either 
to the everyday meanings shared by the actors or, in any simple sense, to reveal the 
intrinsic meaning of the practices. This is the sense in which Foucault's method is 
interpretive but not hermeneutic. Since we share cultural practices with others, and 
since these practices have made us what we are, we have, perforce, some common 
footing from which to proceed, to understand, and to act. But that foothold is no 
longer one which is universal, guaranteed, verified or grounded. We are trying to 
understand the practices of our culture, practices which are by definition 
interpretations. They quite literally and materially embody a historically constituted 
"form of life," to use Wittgenstein's phrase. This form of life has no essence, no 
fixity, no hidden underlying unity. But it nonetheless has its own specific 
coherence.21  
Objectives 
My intention is to investigate why certain modes of thinking about things – how a site of 
ruins became a reminder of something other than a pile of rubble – and engaging with 
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them – preserving them conceivably forever – achieved momentum at a particular moment 
in history, the second half of the nineteenth century, and still holds currency today. I am 
intent on examining this propagating process or mechanism that encapsulates the idea of 
or desire for preservation, first exercised upon things then gradually moving on to include 
ourselves. In doing so, I will show how the main concepts in conservation – authenticity, 
physical integrity and preservation – have been informed by already existing desires or 
fears, and simultaneously have enforced their values as central norms in our lives. In this 
regard, conservation will be treated as a technology, a set of devises or strategies to 
enforce, disseminate and legitimize the knowledge of preservation. As Ward aptly defined 
it: “Conservation is the technology by which preservation is achieved.”22 At last, I will go 
on to argue that conservation, as a technology, aspires to become a form of life in and of 
itself.23 
Research questions 
Genealogy of conservation: How has conservation arrived at where it is now?  
Methodology: What are the benefits and limits of discursive analysis?  
Experiment: How can conservation be studied from the perspective of other disciplines? 
Relevance: What significance does conservation have now and how will it evolve? 
Outline 
In the first chapter, I will examine the roles of controversies, conflicts and dilemmas – 
junctures of impasses – as fertile ground for conservation professionals and other involved 
parties to negotiate the ethical and practical boundaries of the discipline. I will analyze the 
positional problems arising from the negotiation process. The chapter concludes by 
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looking at the conservator’s assumed identity and role, taken as a given, as an advocate of 
artifacts. The continued legacy of this heritage will be put into question by going back to 
its origin. 
In the second chapter, I will consequently investigate the discursive formation of 
preservation during the second half of the nineteenth century in Britain. To define a point 
of departure for the thesis from the history of conservation, I will first analyze Miriam 
Clavir’s method and reasoning in formulating the origin of conservation as a scientific 
discipline that broke free from restoration with the rising belief in scientific knowledge 
and method. I will then proceed to the bulk of the research and present an epistemic shift 
that took place in Britain during the period leading up to the second half of the nineteenth 
century alongside the advance and popularization of evolution, thermodynamics and heat 
engine technology. The purpose of this analysis is to show how theories on the 
preservation and dissipation of energy communicated the merger of two seemingly 
incompatible concepts, namely the “irreversibility of time” and “permanence of an 
energy/life force,” to the Victorians through the technology of the heat engine. This, I will 
argue, are the two tenets of conservation: the formation and practice of discourses on how 
a distinctly human past can have continuity through things and how the desire to prolong 
its hybrid life take form through the control of decay. 
In the third and final chapter, I will look at the future of which any conservation practice 
constantly reminds us. I will examine the notion of a future from the perspective of 
managing decay, and argue that modern anxieties of preservation have enabled 
enhancement technologies that pervade conservation and the entire fabric of our society.  
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Chapter 1 / Controversies 
To my great surprise and indignation I found the finest Rubens we possess, viz.: Peace 
and War...completely flayed. I know no more appropriate word to designate the shameful 
manner in which this splendid work has been treated during the last holidays. The Peace 
and War, so pre-eminently rich and harmonious in colour, is now almost as remarkably 
crude and discordant. With characteristic ignorance the fine rich glazings have been 
scoured off without the slightest regard to, or perception of proportion, so we now have 
the distant objects most offensively confusing themselves with those in the foreground.  
- Complaint made by J. Morris Moore in his letter to The Times, 29 Oct., 1846, regarding 
the newly cleaned "Peace and War" by Rubens. 
The Rubens may be said to have been long buried under repeated coats of yellowed and 
soiled varnish. It was found that these could be removed with perfect safety as the surface 
of the picture had that extreme hardness which the works of this master, above all others, 
often possess. 
- Comment made by Charles Eastlake, Keeper of the Collection, reporting to the 
Trustees.24 
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Public Disputations 
Exchanges such as this introductory one, surrounding the cleaning of a painting at the 
National Gallery in London in 1846, externalize experiences of authenticity and 
conservation’s involvement with them through, usually heated, public debate. In most 
controversies involving conservation, the discipline is attacked or defended in terms of its 
influence on the authenticity of an object by a conservator acting or adversely not acting 
on the object. Conservators are usually faced with opposing sides in these arguments that 
leave them stranded in a position of being damned if they do and damned if they don’t — 
damaging or recovering the authenticity of an object through cleaning or restoration, 
leaving an object to decay or not intervening with the natural aging of an object. Any 
controversy in the form of a public dialogue open to all willing participants inevitably 
questions the authority and duty of conservation professionals with regards to the welfare 
of the object in question. But at the same time, as in the case of the complaint made by 
Moore and the response by Eastlake, the discrepancies between what actually constitutes 
the authenticity of the object, differing evaluations of the state of the object before and 
after a conservation effort, even the quality of the actual conservation work, often turn out 
to be the seeds of controversy.25 
An important function of controversies in the conservation field is that they concretize the 
nature of the interests, interpretations and understandings by putting them in writing or 
verbalizing them. Once problems that may previously have been neglected are expressed 
and exchanged, then measures to resolve such disagreements in the future can be made. 
Consequently, seminars, congresses and conferences for conservation and heritage 
professionals can be regarded as occasions to collectively address the instigating elements 
of conflict and to draw out appropriate resolutions to them. The resulting charters, 
proceedings or reports work as up-to-date markers and measures for current concerns. An 
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example of this is the understanding and weighing of authenticity in the Venice Charter 
(1964), which stresses the physical value objects as evidence of human history and 
outlines objective, scientific methods to preserve them. This view was countered in the 
Burra Charter (1978-88) where cultural significance was brought to the front as the 
principal care. It stresses the social value of objects and introduces subjective methods to 
evaluate and preserve them. The cultural relativism of the Burra Charter was in turn 
revised in the Nara Document on Authenticity (1994), which attempts to reconcile the 
culture of the Burra Charter with the nature of the Venice Charter.26 
Under the umbrella of public controversies and conflicts within conservation 
communities, there are also the opposing concerns of access/use versus 
safeguarding/preservation. It is repeatedly expressed as an unsolvable dilemma, a situation 
in which a difficult choice has to be made with few or no good choices available. For 
example, Clavir articulates her encounter with the predicament as she ponders her 
professional obligations as a conservator in relation to being a public servant, whose role 
is to facilitate the cultural needs of First Nations members:  
My obligation as a professional conservator was to serve as an advocate for the 
preservation of cultural property. […] The professional dilemma of how to resolve 
the apparently opposing needs of First Nations members and my responsibility as a 
conservator was also a personal dilemma: was I ready either to be drummed out of 
MOA (the Museum of Anthropology at the University of British Columbia) for not 
signing the loan forms or to be drummed out of my profession for willingly putting 
museum objects at physical risk?27 
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Clavir’s attempts to resolve such personal and professional predicaments have resulted in 
the recognition of the importance of inviting plural perspectives in her publication 
Preserving What is Valued.28  
As briefly reviewed above, there have always been conflicting views with regards to any 
definition of what constitutes conservation, what its scope and activities are. The 
conservation we know and practice today is accordingly going through constant 
negotiations. Savaldor Muñoz-Viñas views this as a democratizing tendency in 
contemporary conservation that is moving away from the expert-based, agonistic, 
decision-making processes: “The contemporary theory of conservation is based on 
negotiation, on equilibrium, on discussion, and on consensus.”29 Is negotiation, then, a 
problem-free solution to the asymmetry of power relations in conservation decision-
making processes? 
Speaking for Others 
Negotiation empowers the parties involved by motivating their volitions to reach an 
agreement; it is implicit in this motivation that there is something to be gained through the 
mediating process. Secondly, a negotiation, by definition, stresses loss or sacrifice of some 
values to gain others. Usually, the concessions made are ranked in the hierarchy of one's 
own agenda to minimize the loss. By motivating the participants to concede points to 
achieve agreement with other(s), negotiation effectively imposes an impression on all 
parties that they are progressing toward a certain middle, which marks a position relative 
to one's own, but not necessarily a center. The positioning toward and arrival at a shared 
middle ground finally gives the process a sense of justice. 
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Such rules of engagement can equally be applied to a process involving more parties. This 
is often the case in conservation decision-making processes: negotiation is used to mediate 
between the wishes or demands put forward by the stakeholders, be they conservators, 
collectors, museums or the public. Negotiation becomes more difficult, however, when it 
comes to reaching consensus on abstract principles and ethical guidelines without the 
direct and immediate application of, say, a practical and tangible outcome. On the other 
hand, the stakes may seem lower for those involved and consequently lowers the threshold 
for concessions and agreement. 
A common oversight, on which there may be consensus among conservators, rests with 
the fact that ideas and things lack their own will and voice, thus cannot make themselves 
known: “they cannot speak for themselves.”30This silence harbors the ambiguity of core 
concepts in conservation, such as “authenticity” or “the true nature of objects.” Given that 
meanings thus become muffled, the initial muteness encountered in objects always silently 
communicates the inability of the object to make itself clear; it only appears through 
interpretation. This in turn defines the nature of negotiation around objects: a negotiation 
of meanings. We find a similar verdict on what law describes in Ronald Dworkin’s Law as 
Interpretation: 
The puzzle arises because propositions of law seem to be descriptive – they are 
about how things are in the law, not about how they should be – and yet it has 
proved extremely difficult to say exactly what it is that they describe. Legal 
positivists believe that propositions of law are indeed wholly descriptive: they are in 
fact pieces of history.31 
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Law as history sets out a course of negotiations where each descriptive paragraph creates a 
precedent on a case-by-case basis; then, in due process, law becomes descriptive and 
acquires meaning. This unfolding offers a comparative view of how the conservation field 
also filters traditions and common sense into the loftier goals set out, quite prescriptively, 
in professional guidelines. Working with objects as clients inexorably calls for 
conservators to act as their council, speaking on behalf of them. Without stretching the 
legal trope too far, it is worth recalling that conservation professionals often and quite 
enthusiastically appear as advocates for artifacts: 
My obligation as a professional conservator was to serve as an advocate for the 
preservation of cultural property.32 
Our loyalty is not owed to our institutions, organizations, or colleagues, but rather 
to the unique and irreplaceable objects that embody our history.33 
But what does this actually entail, to be advocates for objects, speaking for them? Linda 
Alcoff’s seminal essay, The Problems of Speaking for Others,34 discusses the ethical 
dilemmas of speaking for politically and socially marginalized groups. Although the 
convenient straw men her article posits in “others” are humans, and present a different set 
of problems than of objects, some of the epistemological and metaphysical issues she 
raises in the articulation of speaking, for others, are pertinent to conservation. Alcoff first 
postulates that when one speaks for others, as a representative for them, it also means that 
one speaks about them, by defining their status, needs, goals and ultimately who they are. 
Since representation is not possible without involving one’s own perceptions and 
interpretations, speaking for them also means speaking for oneself. This gets more 
complicated if silent clients are less privileged or come from a different background than 
the appointed advocate: representation can then be oppressive and repressive, denying 
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other perspectives and voices to be heard. Therefore, Alcoff does see promise in Gayatri 
Spivak’s approach that replaces “speaking for” with “speaking to,” because it lessens the 
authority and privilege of the appointed advocate, for the benefit of other concerns. 
What, then, is the motivation of appointed advocates for artifacts. Because if conservators 
are to avoid speaking solely on their own behalf, as it is often stressed in codes of conduct 
and implied in scientific methodology, they have to be clear about and aware of the 
positions of the discursive practice of conservation that they are part of. This awareness 
can be called into question when conservation as a professional discipline is built on “a 
belief in the preservation of other cultural material, a mission that has seemed so 
fundamentally worthwhile and desirable that it has not even been considered debatable.”35 
Rarely has advocacy been associated with an equally authoritative, even arrogant, stance, 
but the public disputations that call for accountability and a greater synthesis of voices 
have to some extent humbled this legacy from the origins of conservation. 
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Chapter 2 / Past Origins 
The Origins of Conservation 
Art conservation was built on a belief in the preservation of other cultural material, 
a mission that has seemed so fundamentally worthwhile and desirable that it has not 
even been considered debatable.36 
The origins of conservation, as a distinct professional occupation, have usually been traced 
back to the juncture where it broke from traditional restoration. It evolved from a 
traditional artisan occupation to an organized profession with its own codes of conduct, 
defined methodologies37 and epistemological alliance with empirical science.38  
The authors who share this view look at the period between 1930, when The International 
Conference for the Study of Scientific Methods Applied to the Examination and 
Conservation of Works of Art was held in Rome, and 1950, when the International 
Institute for the Conservation of Museum Objects was established in London, as a marker 
for the raised recognition of conservation among its practitioners and the public as a 
distinct discipline. The formative period leading up to the first gathering of founders of a 
conservation profession in Rome in 1930 can be stretched back to the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, when scientists had first been brought into the museums to investigate 
and assist in solving problems related to the restoration of deteriorated materials. This 
collaboration between scientists and museums resulted in the opening of the first 
conservation laboratory in Berlin in 1888.  
But why did museums look to scientists for solutions? Clavir formulates the reasons for 
this to be a newly formulated analytic recognition of the nature and conditions of 
materials, as opposed to objects.39 However, rather than pursuing the nature of this shift of 
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interest from objects to materials further,40 Clavir turns to circumstances that may have 
contributed to people’s increased awareness of the deteriorating condition of objects: the 
industrial pollution that had accelerated the rate of deterioration to a perceivable rate, and 
the large flow of excavated antiquities, which were often fragmentary and deteriorating 
rapidly in reaction to a new environment, into museums.41 Such increased qualitative and 
quantitative visibility of deteriorated objects may, according to Clavir, “have fueled the 
desire to be able to see them in their original state (i.e. cleaned and whole).”42 At the same 
time, in the case of excavated archaeological objects being made of physically and 
chemically unstable materials such as metals, she argues that traditional restoration 
methods had proven to be inadequate to safeguard the physical integrity of the objects, 
which was paramount to archaeology. From these observations, Clavir draws the two 
fundamental tenets of conservation: “respect for the integrity of the object and for a 
systematic analytical approach to preserving it.”43 
I will focus on a few aspects that are distinct in Clavir’s view on the origin of conservation 
from the perspective of considering the nature of the “juncture” that the two tenets of 
conservation proposes. First and foremost is the view that conservation was born as a 
consequence of the Enlightenment. This can be observed as she traces the period’s 
increasing interest in scientific knowledge and methodology back to this era. Quoting 
Pearce on modernity’s preoccupation with meta-narratives that are built on a belief in 
objective reality and individuality, she claims that a new paradigm of thinking emerged 
with the advancement and acceptance of science as a meta-narrative, which, in turn, 
provides the conservation field with “a rational explanation of the organization and 
interrelatedness of systems of knowledge” 44 that has been crucial to the development of 
conservation as a professional discipline. In doing so, she posits that conservation was 
simultaneously informed by and exploited the growing status of science in primarily 
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European and North American society.45 In other words, she seems to suggest that the 
break from craft-oriented, traditional restoration was inevitable in an atmosphere that had 
accepted the superiority of rational thinking. 
Secondly, the already noted changes in society, industrialization (cause of unprecedented 
pollution) and imperial expansion (source of the flow of archaeological objects from 
elsewhere), during the formative period of conservation are only treated as contributing 
factors to the increased visibility of deterioration in objects. Simultaneously, the desire to 
be able to see them in their original state was taken for granted as if it were a natural and 
logical reaction to the appalling sights of broken objects in increasingly expansive 
museums. Combined, Clavir’s accounts of the juncture where conservation emerged from 
restoration fails to fully explain a crucial change in motivation between the two; from the 
ancient motivation to simply repair or modify objects to suit either utilitarian or non-
utilitarian purposes to the motivation to “assume the role of guardians of the welfare of 
objects.”46 She treats human consciousness as a set of predictable functions that can be 
processed to generate appropriate outputs according to input from the dominant epistemic 
frames of a period. Thus, under influence of the Enlightenment, it seemed most natural to 
respond to the sight of a deteriorated condition with a systematic and analytical mode of 
mind, to make it whole. According to such a scheme, any intent toward conservation must 
conceive and recognize core values as preservation and integrity as if they were already 
and always latent and emerged, naturally, when exposed to the right kind of stimuli. 
Similar views are expressed in Ward’s The Nature of Conservation: A Race against Time:  
For at least a century before 1930, many museums employed restorers as staff 
members or as private contractors. Having neither the knowledge nor the 
technology to avoid or control deterioration, they naturally pursued a philosophy 
quite different from that of modern conservators.47    
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If we are to better understand the emergence of conservation from a perspective 
synthesizing when, how and why a specific quality or notion of objects became desirable, 
and a specific and organized, scientific, effort to achieve this was devised, we have to look 
at what has been described as, and now seems to be, “a fundamentally worthwhile and 
desirable mission” in depth.48 We should not now, centuries later, take the heritage of a 
welfare of objects, destined for posterity, through preservation for granted. It emerged, 
circulated and acquired currency among people at one point in the nineteenth century. In 
order to understand the nature of this emergent desire for conservation, we must examine, 
more explicitly, why they desired such knowledge and techniques.49 
In the following three sections, Celestial Mechanics, Catastrophe and Evolution, and 
Thermodynamics and the Arrow of Time, I will examine the formation of a discourse on 
preservation and conservation, which is frequently and poignantly described as “a 
fundamentally worthwhile and desirable mission”50 during the second half of the 
nineteenth century in Britain. 
Celestial Mechanics 
In 1799, Pierre-Simon Laplace published the first two volumes of Celestial Mechanics. 
The title speaks of his ambition to “apply the principles of mechanics to the motions and 
figures of the heavenly bodies.”51 His use of the term “mechanics” to capture the operation 
of the universe was, however, not new. Indeed, comparisons of the universe to a perfect 
machine or mechanical clock, governed by the Newtonian law of universal gravitation, 
had been very popular during the Enlightenment. This analogy between the universe and a 
machine rendered everything, from cosmological to terrestrial events, certain, explainable 
and predictable with an “unexpected degree of precision.”52 Thus, in 1814, Laplace went 
on to articulate a first theory of scientific determinism, known as Laplace’s Demon: 
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We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause 
of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set 
nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed. […] 
For such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past 
would be present before its eyes.53 
Here we have an image that unites a cosmology based on the Newtonian dynamic 
mechanism of force and motion and a time that is coiled up inside it. 
 
 
Figure 1: Grand orrey. Attributed to a design by James Ferguson. 1780. 
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That is how Laplace’s Demon could calculate the precise state of the cosmos at any time. 
His supreme intellect “would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of 
all items of which nature is composed.”  What is significant is that time in Newtonian 
cosmology, which is built upon vector calculus, 54 can only be explained in terms of the 
difference between two positions and velocities. Time in Newtonian dynamics is thus 
modeled after a pendulum motion, where there is no distinctive boundary between the past 
and the future — the directional arrow of time does not exist. 
 
Figure 2: Newton's trajectory. 
 
Another important implication of the Newtonian clockwork universe was that “a Clock 
continues to go without the Assistance of a Clockmaker.”55 The independence of such 
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designs was unsurprisingly taken as heresy by Newton’s devoted Christian 
contemporaries. Because, once the clock has been created and set in motion by the 
clockmaker, there is no need for a capital Him to impose himself in its inner or outer 
workings; the future is already ordained. Yet, this perfectly harmonious and orderly 
universe seems at odds with the disorderly and random experiences of our everyday life. 
One way to resolve this paradox within Newtonian determinism was the notion of 
deterministic chaos — unpredictability within predictability. Chaos seems random because 
we are ignorant of all the details of the universe and the universe itself is not conscious of 
the laws of its own workings either. 
Catastrophe and Evolution 
After a century had unfolded to the soothing rhythm of a clock’s steady ticking, the 
nineteenth century began with an apocalyptic image delivered by the Reverend Thomas 
Robert Malthus. In An Essay on the Principle of Population, published in 1789, after 
observing the rapid industrialization and the population growth in the urban areas, Malthus 
laid out his political economic theory on how unchecked exponential population growth, 
which exceeds the limited, arithmetical growth of the food supply, will result in premature 
death: 
The power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce 
subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape or other visit the 
human race. The vices of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. 
They are the precursors in the great army of destruction, and often finish the 
dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in this war of extermination, sickly 
seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague advance in terrific array, and sweep off 
their thousands and tens of thousands. Should success be still incomplete, gigantic 
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inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with one mighty blow levels the population 
with the food of the world.56 
This fate of premature death, the Malthusian catastrophe, stirred and preoccupied the 
minds of the Victorians during the first half of the nineteenth century. Malthusian fate, 
nonetheless, was different in character from the precise preordained, destiny of Newtonian 
determinism. Malthus believed in two types of social measures (“checks” in Malthusian 
terms) of restricting the growth of population. The first of these were preventive checks, 
which are indirect, moral enforcements such as sexual abstinence and delayed marriage. 
The second types were positive checks, which directly result in returning the population to 
a more sustainable level. Positive checks include events such as disease, starvation and 
war that lead to premature death: 
The passion between the sexes has appeared in every age to be so nearly the same 
that it may always be considered, in algebraic language, as a given quantity. The 
great law of necessity which prevents population from increasing in any country 
beyond the food which it can either produce or acquire, is a law so open to our 
view...that we cannot for a moment doubt it. The different modes which nature takes 
to prevent or repress a redundant population do not appear, indeed, to us so certain 
and regular, but though we cannot always predict the mode we may with certainty 
predict the fact.57 
While Malthus invoked the Newtonian laws of Nature as he defines the checks to be “the 
great laws of necessity,” he also saw their unpredictable and irregular nature of 
occurrence, which, in turn, made him recognize the value of vigilance in checking the 
circumstances that may contribute to the overgrowth of the population.58 In other words, 
Malthusian catastrophe, in which prematurity bred horror in the Victorian mind, seemed, 
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at first hand, an inevitable consequence of both Victorian Man’s nature and most crucially, 
in this context, his actions. Malthus’s thesis about Man’s struggle for survival given 
limited resources, and the circumstances that thus regulates the population, was influential 
in Darwin’s formulation of natural selection: 
In October 1838, that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic inquiry, I 
happened to read for amusement Malthus on Population, and being well prepared to 
appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on from long-continued 
observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these 
circumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavourable 
ones to be destroyed. The results of this would be the formation of a new species. 
Here, then I had at last got a theory by which to work.59  
By the early 1800s, the idea of evolution was taking hold.60 What most people who took 
up the idea grappled with was how to explain the force that enables such progressive 
change. Darwin’s account for the mechanism of evolution, which was one of two main 
aims that he wished to achieve in On the Origin of Species, was natural selection. He 
coined the term, natural selection, using an analogy with a breeder’s practice, artificial 
selection. Darwin himself was an avid pigeon breeder and well aware of how certain, 
desirable characters of plants or animals could be selected and encouraged through 
breeding, but struggled with how this could be applied in nature.61  
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Figure 3: Diagram in Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection (New York, NY: D. 
Appleton, 1860), 108. Courtesy of The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto. 
 
Darwin’s adoption of the notion of population to biology sharply distinguished his 
evolutionary theory from others up to that moment. First, it provided a necessary condition 
for why natural selection, in the first place, occurs. Accepting the fact that there are always 
more organisms produced than the environment can afford, the struggle between 
organisms for survival is the inevitable outcome. On the other hand, population growth 
also means abundant variation within members; thus, the struggle for life is a matter of 
individual fitness. Finally, the concept of population, by definition, is closely tied to the 
concept of locality, which circumscribes the unique condition and extent of the workings 
of natural selection. Therefore, two populations of the same species might evolve 
differently in different regions. The implication of thinking in terms of populations was a 
clear conceptual shift from an individual, essential view to a non-essential view of an 
entire, and all, species, including humanity, because “populations vary not by their 
essences but only by mean statistical differences.”62   
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What most troubled the Victorians was this notion of population that On the Origin of 
Species embraced. With its statistical foothold, the complexity of humanity, its bifurcation 
and evolution, were rendered as ultimately random, contingent phenomena,63 without any 
distinction from other species: “the many complex contingencies, on which the existence 
of each species depends.”64 
As much as the Victorians were fascinated and appalled by the populist caricature of 
Darwin’s Man emerging out of a chimpanzee, their “understanding of the world, the way 
they envisioned the future and reflected upon the past”65 were undergoing transformation 
by contingent thinking in which “the future is as real or more so than the present.”66 As 
much as the present had been revealed as infinite contingencies of the past, thoughts of the 
future had also evolved from a singular inevitability to many statistical probabilities.  
Yet, according to Lorraine Daston, by the mid-nineteenth century, when On the Origin of 
Species was published,67 “the emergence of the statistical sciences and the rise of the 
middle classes [had already been] radically transformed popular attitudes toward causality, 
especially with respect to the material future.”68 Indeed, the 1840s and 1850s had 
experienced a series of commercial crisis – investment crashes in the 1840s, bank failures 
in 1850s, the Stock Exchange Panic of 1859 – that had contributed to the enactment of the 
Limited Liability Act in 1855 amidst widespread anxiety about financial speculation.69 
This suggests that by the time On the Origin of Species arrived, it was not a foreign 
thought to conceive of one’s own being and becoming in terms of contingency: 
In the mid-nineteenth century, contingent thinking was routine in modern life, as 
both the mode and matter of scientific inquiry, as an element of financially prudent 
behavior, and as a recurrent means of representing fictional interiorities.70  
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Thermodynamics and the Arrow of Time 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the period between Malthus’s publication of 
An Essay on the Principle of Population in 1789 and Darwin’s On Origin of Species in 
1858, there was widespread interest in what was labeled a “science of heat.” Heat had 
entered into a comprehensive study of cause and effect to unlock the secrets behind the 
productive force of heat engine designs. A heat engine is different from a purely 
mechanical engine in one crucial aspect: the heat engine transforms matter to transmit 
energy in a chain of causality — coal produces heat, which engineers motion. In a 
mechanical engine, energy is also transferred, but cause and effect are often visibly of the 
same nature — motion returns motion.71 The problem was, just as dastardly friction put a 
stop to the mechanical perpetuum mobile, that there was seemingly a tremendous loss of 
“heat” between each transforming phase in an operating engine.  
In an attempt to improve the performance of heat engines, Sadi Carnot laid in 1824 out 
basic relations between heat, power, energy and efficiency. By outlining a directional 
causality, he also described the core ideas of thermodynamics, albeit in a highly idealized 
and hopeful form. In 1843, James Prescott Joule finally defined the missing link of 
“energy.” It was a postulated concept of equivalence between states that he had observed 
in physiochemical transformations (e.g. Galvani’s experiment where electricity induces 
convulsions in a frog’s legs). This concept of energy, as a unifying element that could 
explain the observed relatedness of one phenomenon to another, was crucial in 
formulating the first law of thermodynamics. Hermann von Helmholtz articulated the first 
law independently in 1847. It states that energy cannot be created or destroyed; it can only 
be redistributed or transformed. 
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In 1850 and 1852 respectively, Rudolf Clausius and William Thomson formulated the 
second law of thermodynamics, which was based on Fourier’s 1815 theory on the 
propagation of heat. It states that within any thermodynamically closed system, the total of 
energy is conserved, but the potential energy is always less than that of the initial state. 
The second law was better articulated later with the introduction of entropy into states of 
equilibrium: within any thermodynamically closed system not in thermal equilibrium, 
entropy always increases with time and energy changes to less usable forms. Combined, 
the first two laws of thermodynamics speak of the preservation and dissipation of energy 
over time. 
The significance of thermodynamics as a scientific theory is that it defines heat as energy, 
a new observable object, and a system that consists of macroscopic measures, such as 
temperature, pressure and volume. It further describes boundary conditions in that the 
system relates to and responds to its environment. Thermodynamics is therefore 
fundamentally a theory of predicting a system’s response to modifications imposed from 
the outside, not a way of predicting the internal changes in a system caused by interaction 
among enclosed particles, which was the main concern of a Newtonian dynamics.72The 
significance of thermodynamics in a broader spectrum is that it implies the final end to a 
perpetual universe, such as the Newtonian clockwork analogy, painstakingly realized with 
a craftsman's precision. It speaks of irrecoverable loss of energy and time starting and 
ending in one direction, straight as an arrow.73 With the scene set by such unfathomable 
and certainly hard to reproduce images, the significance of thermodynamic language 
became more profound. 
The first thing to consider in terms of thermodynamic language is that the basic concepts – 
heat, conservation of energy, irreversibility of time-based events and entropy – had 
already been conceived since antiquity through observations of nature. Energy flows into 
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the primal life force of vis viva, cyclical seasons speak of the transfer and conservation of 
energy, births and deaths recall the dissipation of energy and the irreversibility of time, 
and entropy, finally, is reflected in the most human of mirrors, the one of disorder and 
decline. The arrival of the first two laws of thermodynamics, as Greg Meyers and Barri J. 
Gold has pointed out, were thus greeted by empirical weight and granted instant 
authority.74 William Thomson elaborates further on the second law of thermodynamics, 
ending with the troublesome concept of irreversible processes, which was quickly 
consoled by preservation: 
[...] for the mechanical effect derivable from a given quantity of heat by means of a 
perfect engine in which the range of temperatures is infinitely small, expresses truly 
the greatest effect which can possibly be obtained in the circumstances; although it 
is in reality only an infinitely small fraction of the whole mechanical equivalent of 
the heat supplied; the remainder being irrevocably lost to man and therefore 
"wasted," although not annihilated.75  
Originally stated in Carnot’s earlier theory, the idea of irreversible processes, which 
calculates production as a negative sum when strictly limited by purpose, had been 
augmented by Thomson’s theological beliefs. The lost heat was thankfully only 
irrevocably lost to man, but not lost in the universe.76 And it is the way in which Thomson 
used the term “waste” to articulate the transformation of energy into its unusable form, 
bound energy attributed and lost to man, that foresaw the growing Victorian anxiety over 
degradation and waste, moral declination and squandering of wealth,77 as well as real 
everyday concerns involving sanitation and recycling.78 Such understandable anxiety over 
the inevitable degradation that announces the future was exacerbated by Thomson’s 
alarming prediction in Macmillan's Magazine, dated 1862, of the “heat death” of the sun: 
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The result would inevitably be a state of universal rest and death, if the universe 
were finite and left to obey existing laws. But it is impossible to conceive a limit to 
the extent of matter in the universe; and therefore science points rather to an endless 
progress, through an endless space, of action involving the transformation of 
potential energy into palpable motion and hence into heat, than to a single finite 
mechanism, running down like a clock, and stopping for ever.79 
Having conveniently forgotten about the Malthusian prophecy of premature death of 
mankind by unchecked exponential population growth, this Victorian optimism was 
supported only briefly by the evolutionary theories that seemed to promise orderly 
progress, forever and ever upward. Scientific laws of decay and degradation threatened 
this order. An unsettling self-awareness of progress leading to destruction had been 
growing since the 1830s and it had regularly been confirmed by worldly events and 
developments: the devastating cholera epidemics of 1832, 1849 and 1852, the growing 
pollution of the urban environment, and the rapid topographical changes brought about by 
industrialization. With such strong undercurrents of anxiety, social commentators such as 
Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin and Henry Adams used the scientifically loaded language of 
thermodynamics (“social energy” was coined by Adams) to prescribe laws of social and 
moral order.80 Borrowing from the first law of thermodynamics, Carlyle emphasized the 
permanence of the human soul and the essential commonness of human thought, which 
circulates through incarnate forms of human activity: 
Thus in all Poetry, Worship, Art, Society, as one form passes into another, nothing is 
lost: it is but the superficial, as it were the body only, that grows obsolete and dies; 
under the mortal body lies a soul which is immortal; which anew incarnates itself in 
fairer revelation.81  
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Conversely, scientists like Balfour Stewart used an analogy of economy to illustrate the 
energy transfer for his layman crowd: 
The world of mechanism is not a manufactory, in which energy is created, but rather 
a mart, into which we may bring energy of one kind and change or barter it for an 
equivalent of another kind, that suits us better — but if we come with nothing in our 
hand, with nothing we shall most assuredly return.82 
Such messages by a mixture of social prophets and scientists spread throughout popular 
magazines. Household Words, made famous by Charles Dickens, regularly featured 
humorous abstracts of renowned scientist Michael Faraday’s popular lecture series. An 
article titled The Mysteries of a Tea-Kettle, penned by Percival Leigh and published in 
1850, was one of those amusing twists on the laws of the universe. It delivered the basic 
concepts of thermodynamics through steam struggling to escape from a kettle. In her 
analysis of the article, Tina Young Choi focuses on the narrator’s moral undertone as he 
prompts the reader to not let the steam escape from the kettle. In this context, the 
preservation of steam is presented as an ethical and righteous action with desirable 
consequences. If conserved, the steam, used as an image of industrial power and national 
interest, could even result in furthering imperial dominance.83 That boils conservation 
down to a formidable cup of tea. 
Such wide propagation of thermodynamic ideas and ideals, where preservation and 
conservation of energy was essential to maintain well being, among Victorians during the 
second half of the nineteenth century was possible due to the confluence of many spheres 
of influence. The popularization of thermodynamic discourse clearly reflects the Victorian 
desire to include the guiding principles of these laws into all facets of society. Struck by 
epidemics and rapid changes in their environment brought about by the industrial 
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revolution, Victorians voraciously consumed universal narratives that alleviated anxiety 
about destructive destiny and reinforced a moral duty to preserve and conserve through 
human actions. The same sense of purpose underpins conservation efforts today. 
 
  
Figure 4: An image of the New Zealander, from London: a Pilgrimage by 
Blanchard Jerrold and Gustave Doré, 1872. 
“Now we have watched the fleets into noisy Billingsgate; and now gossiped 
looking towards Wren's grand dome, shaping Macaulay's dream of the far 
future, with the tourist New Zealander upon the broken parapets, 
contemplating something matching - The glory that was Greece - The 
grandeur that was Rome.” 
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Chapter 3 / Future Ends 
Though the books were so much trouble to keep alive, to maintain against decay, this only 
made him care more for them. In this, CN-344315 was simply learning the lesson that 
every parent knew: it is the effort given to protect and nourish the helpless that binds you 
to them with love, tighter and tighter. Each time that he had to rush to reinforce the small 
room against an oncoming storm, each time he had to labor to eliminate a fungal or 
entomological threat, each time he sat, patiently, and examined each page of a hundred 
books for signs of damage–he came to love them more. […] For ten minutes, they were 
not sitting in a decaying library on an ancient, forgotten planet. For ten minutes, they 
were in a place, at a time, where talking tortoises and caterpillars who tossed salads made 
sense. For ten minutes, they were not an old robot and a young girl, but readers, 
communing with an author across an ocean of one hundred thousand years. An entire 
world rose, grew, and blossomed around them as they read. […] CN-344315 knew that 
the book would not last. The child’s hands were rough. She might leave it out in the rain, 
might spill juice on it, might tear its ancient pages out of carelessness. She might tire of 
the book and lose it like a cheap toy. Yet CN-344315 had no regrets as he handed the book 
to Erin. The Council was right about one thing: books are only alive when they’re read. 
For books are seeds, and they grow in minds. 
- From “Summer Reading” by Ken Liu, 2012. 
  
38 
 
On Decay 
Any non-purposeful, non-antrhopogenic departure from the initial state (which is 
expressed digitally by the ultimate copy) towards any other less ordered state is 
labeled as decay — or deterioration, disintegration, crumbling, collapse, 
decomposition, destruction, corrosion or another synonym. In other words, all 
change is decay by definition.84 
Even before the thermodynamic language infiltrated the Victorian cultural and social 
fabrics, decay had frequently been described in terms of an irresistible force of time. It 
was the degenerative tendency of all life forms. But in decay the sum of vis viva, the force 
of life, remains always constant; decay or death of one life form or object creates a place 
for a new one to come. 
For most of human history, decay as an observable phenomenon was only available in life 
forms with a much shorter lifespan than human beings, such as plant, insects, animals, etc. 
As for inanimate objects, their decay was presented as a ruined site, an aftermath where a 
decaying process had already taken place.85 Therefore, before the advances of technology 
and science that enables us to observe and closer examine the mechanisms of decay, such 
as a microscope or pathology, the technical inadequacy in keeping up with the rapidness 
or slowness of decay – the former being the case for creatures with a short lifespan, and 
the latter for inanimate things – had rendered the decaying process an utterly mythical and 
mysterious phenomenon that humans could perceive but not quite fathom. Naturally, the 
understanding of decay was then largely limited to morphological changes that took place 
in time, which in turn evoked aesthetic and literary responses that related to the collection 
of fragments and decryption of ciphers: 
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Many works of the ancients have become fragments. Many works of the moderns are 
fragments at the time of their origin.86 
What is the antique in Rome if not a great book whose pages have been destroyed or 
ripped out by time, it being left to modern research to fill in the blanks, to bridge the 
gaps?87 
Ruskin’s appreciation of ruins was inexorably informed by the Kantian sublime. Any ruin 
was a testimonial site where the irresistible, magnificent power of time had been acted 
upon:  
...the greatest glory of a building is not in its stones, nor in its gold. Its glory is in its 
Age, and in that deep sense of voicefulness, of stern watching, of mysterious 
sympathy, nay, even of approval or condemnation, which we feel in walls that have 
long been washed by the passing waves of humanity.88 
Here, we observe that there is always a resignation that there is no place for Man’s 
volition in the degenerative process of decay; that, against our intuition for the eternal 
force of life, the forms of life cannot afford it and always deplete it to zero. This 
resignation, accepting it as a natural course, which itself is a way of explaining things, 
demands humbleness on behalf of anyone who reflects upon it, constantly reminding 
oneself that she is also implied in due course. Thus, in 1860 an anonymous poem, titled A 
Human Skull, appeared in Cornhill Magazine: 
If life no more can yield us what it gave 
It is still linked with much that calls for praises- 
A very worth less rogue may dig the grave, 
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But hands unseen will dress the turf with daisies. 
Between the seventeenth and nineteenth century, however, such destiny-ridden common 
attitude towards decay was slowly undergoing change, largely informed by the languages 
of sciences and technologies that were dedicated to uncovering the process of decay. In 
1844, German chemist and physiologist Justus von Liebig first articulated the process of 
decay in terms of fermentation and putrefaction:  
Fermentation or putrefaction represents the first stage of the resolution of complex 
atoms into more simple combinations: the process of decay completes the 
circulation of the elements by transposing the products of fermentation and 
putrefaction into gaseous compounds. Thus the elements constituting all organised 
beings, which previously to participating in the vital process were oxygen 
compounds, such as with carbon and hydrogen, reassume the form of oxygen 
compounds. The process of decay is a process of combustion taking place at the 
common temperature89 in which the products of the fermentation and putrefaction of 
plants and animal bodies combine gradually with the oxygen of the atmosphere. 
Liebig was initially interested in a physiology of respiration, in which “a living being 
could be described in precise physical and chemical terms.”90 In this regard, what deserves 
our attention here is Liebig’s conscious avoidance of using the actual term decay, in favor 
of the more scientific and esoteric term “Eremacausis.” His intent was to separate decay 
from its many vernacular usages: 
In order to avoid the ambiguity attached to the word decay, from its being in 
vernacular language applied to several processes which it is desirable to 
distinguish, the author proposed to substitute the term Eremacausis, and this has 
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been very generally adopted in scientific treatises, being a convenient mode of 
expressing the relation of decay to ordinary combustion.91 
But by explaining decay as a purely chemical process, Liebig also succeeded in expelling 
the lingering notion of a central and vital force of life. Molecular forces now depleted and 
replenished a life force: 
No organised substance, no part of any plant or animal, after the extinction of the 
vital principle, is capable of resisting the chemical action of air and moisture; for all 
that power of resistance which they temporarily possessed as the bearers of life, the 
media of the vital manifestations, completely ceases with the death of the organism; 
their elements fall again under the unlimited dominion of the chemical forces.92 
Decay is now a concrete, chemical process, merely transforming one molecular structure 
to another, either coupling with oxygen or losing hydrogen. From withering plants to 
crumbling stones, decay can be explained as a concrete effect produced by interactions 
with agents that trigger internal changes. If a phenomenon can thus be explained in terms 
of cause and effect, it implies that the phenomenon can be manipulated. It can be 
accelerated, stopped or reversed by manipulating interactions between the agents or 
changing the conditions that are attributed to the evocation of the phenomenon. This was 
the case with Liebig, and he found its immediate utility in prolonging the life of wine and 
beer: 
The application of our knowledge respecting the phenomena attendant upon decay, 
to the manufacture of beer and wine, is easy and obvious. […] if we possessed any 
means of preventing the transformation of alcohol into acetic acid we should be able 
to preserve wine and beer for an unlimited period, and to bring these liquors into a 
state of perfect maturity.93 
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According to Pye, such investigations of decay as mechanisms were crucial steps toward a 
move from restoration toward conservation, moving the locus of preservation “from 
surfaces and appearances [of objects] to structures and mechanisms of change.” However, 
this did not immediately lead to changes in preservation techniques, because the arrest of 
decay had not yet found its usefulness in our engagement with objects, which so far had 
been mostly focused on aesthetic experiences and functional uses. It was not until other 
disciplines (archaeology, anthropology, art history, biology, zoology and geology) were 
actively establishing and refining their material-based research methods that the 
informational loss that accompanies the physical decay of an object finally became an 
important issue.94  
To revisit the last quoted statement by Liebig, the knowledge and control of a mechanism 
associated with decay not only found its application, to prevent the transformation of 
alcohol into acetic acid, but also its purpose, to preserve wine and beer, as well as its 
expression, for an unlimited period, into a state of perfect maturity. But such a revelation 
would only have been possible through a revised technology; in other words, it was only 
through devising and operating a specific technology that decay could speak the precise 
language of wine and beer — maturity. But what is this intoxicating maturity of wine and 
beer that Liebig tastes? The term maturity enables the unity between two distinct qualities 
of wine and beer: one that is scientific, the verifiable, objective state of decay, and another 
that is anthropomorphic and cultural, how ripe a wine may be to the conditioned taste 
buds. In that way, a technology of managing decay renders decay useful by providing us 
with a set of criteria and a language in which we evaluate both the usefulness of the decay 
and the contribution of the technology itself.  In similar vein, Barbara Appelbaum 
articulates the roles and aims of conservation methodology using the concept of utility: 
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The methodology addresses the two major goals of conservation treatment, 
preservation and interpretation. […] A term that economists use – utility – combines 
the benefits of treatment in a single measure. […] Simply put, the purpose of 
conservation treatment is to maximize an object’s utility. The immediate 
improvement in an object’s state (interpretation) that results from treatment and the 
span of time over which such improvements will last (preservation) are equal factors 
in the utility of a treated object: degree of improvement multiplied by time equals 
utility. […] Slowing an object’s deterioration also increases utility. […] The overall 
goal of conservation treatment is to maximize usability and longevity. Use and 
preservation are not antagonists. An object that cannot be used – for research, 
exhibition, or any other physical or intellectual use – provides no benefit. Simple 
arithmetic tells us that an unusable object, even if it lasts forever, has zero utility.95  
Conservation as an Enhancement Technology 
Increasing the utility of things through the management of decay is, as already noted in the 
case of alcoholic beverages, not reserved for the realm of a professional conservation 
discipline. There is a consummate popular interest in the aging mechanisms and the 
management of bodies to prolong life and enhance appearances with a youthful look that 
never goes out of fashion. To achieve this, there are entire industries catering to the radical 
alternatives of plastic and cosmetic surgery, which manage the signs of aging either by 
incisions of injections to permanently or temporarily mask the onset of decay. However 
strained and horrible that windblown look of excessive nip and tuck has become, it speaks 
loudly of an obsessive desire and will to manage, at any cost. To work on the same look 
from the inside, there are dietary supplement and designated health foods that advertise 
benefits far, far beyond daily subsistence. Coupled with a monthly membership at one of 
44 
 
the many gyms, with their vanity-mirrored walls to measure the cause and effect of every 
repetition, the options available to any man or woman intent on managing decay to 
increase utility today are indeed plentiful. 
There are synergetic relationships between the development of enhancement technologies 
and our concern and desire to control and submit to ideal states of being. But an ideal state 
of being does not always have to evoke the eternally youthful body: it is the degree of our 
mastery of decay in body and mind that matters. Common colloquial phrases that testify to 
this compromised state of being include “balance in life” and that old chestnut, “aging 
gracefully.” Echoing Liebig, it seems that bringing our body and mind into “a state of 
perfect maturity”96 has become the priority. Pye employs similar rhetoric when defining 
the aims and scopes of conservation: “Conservation aims for reasonably stable health, rather 
than no change at all.”97 
 
 
Figure 5: Cosmetic advertisement by Garnier. 
45 
 
 
Figure 6: Conservation of the Mona Lisa by Leonardo da Vinci. 
 
When decay is explained and understood in terms of molecular bindings and exchanges, 
and can be intimately managed as such, our sense of the bodily mass is overwhelmed by 
diagrams with colorful, connected dots that are moved around for effect. Our body appears 
similarly atomized and abstract, having lost the wholesome corporealness that once 
provided a laboring yet poetic passage between birth and death. Instead, we think of the 
body in terms of a utility brought to life, with benefits, by and through various mastering 
technologies. Susan Stewart articulates this close relationship between the abstraction and 
commodification of the body: 
In contrast to this model body, the body of lived experience is subject to change, 
transformation, and, most importantly, death. The idealized body implicitly denies 
the possibility of death — it attempts to present a realm of transcendence and 
immortality, a realm of the classic. This is the body-made-object, and thus the body 
as potential commodity, taking place within the abstract and infinite cycle of 
exchange.98 
46 
 
Appelbaum’s take on conservation treatment as a means to maximize the utility of objects 
on behalf of human interests speaks of the exact same cycle of exchange: 
The overall goal of conservation treatment is to maximize usability and longevity. 
Use and preservation are not antagonists. […] The goal of treatment is to enhance 
the values, use, and meaning the object has to its custodians and other stakeholders 
into the indefinite future. An object that cannot be used – for research, exhibition, or 
any other physical or intellectual use – provides no benefit. Simple arithmetic tells 
us that an unusable object, even if it lasts forever, has zero utility.99  
In What’s Wrong with Enhancement Technologies, Carl Elliott examines the moral 
problems rising out of bio-enhancement technologies, remedial interventions that are 
designed to improve “human capacities and characteristics.”100 Four of those problems are 
highly relevant to conservation: the problem of cultural complicity, the problem of 
authenticity, the problem of relativism and the drive for mastery. The first leads to 
idealized normalization, in that certain cultural norms are reinforced through the 
technologies. The second deals with the fact that the diagnosis of a condition is influenced 
by time, place, particular cultural contexts and available technology to diagnose and treat 
the condition. The third deals with the difficulty of locating and describing an authentic 
experience. In response to a patient’s complaint, who does not feel like herself anymore 
after being without medication, Prozac, for several months, Elliott asks if her “self” should 
now be described as a new transformed state, after Prozac, or as a restoration to an 
previous state, the lost state that Prozac unlocked. These conundrums are familiar to 
conservators. The last problem is the overarching “drive for mastery,” a term Elliott 
borrows from political theorist Michael Sandel. All enhancement technologies reflect, 
according to Elliott: “an attitude that views the world as something to be manipulated, 
mastered, and controlled.”101  
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While this drive with a presumed obnoxious attitude often ends up with unequivocally 
negative connotations in cultural studies, it is nevertheless, on a practical level, the 
ultimate goal of conservation to develop a craft that masters and manages the materials 
and objects put before it as a discipline. What we may take away from this brief foray into 
enhancement technologies are the close ties between the culturally conditioned treatments 
prescribed for all subjects and objects of decay. The wrinkles on a woman’s face and the 
fissures on a vase suffer from the same condition and may be treated with the same 
pathological fervor. It is important to always remember, then, when evaluating a course of 
action before jumping on the cure, that all enhancement technologies are already inscribed 
by a set of decisions and desires that gave rise to their very existence. A conservator 
should carefully consider what utility, if any, is lost by decay.  
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Conclusion 
In this thesis, the discourse of conservation has been examined in three different aspects 
over three chapters. The first chapter dealt with ethical and technical problems arising 
from conservators assuming a position as guardians of and gatekeepers to the material 
past. Within this role rests the responsibility of speaking for and behalf of others in the 
shapes and forms that are formulated and expressed through the technological rituals and 
idiomatic conventions of a discursive practice. Upon each and every critical reflection, 
however, it became clear that with this responsibility comes a burden that breeds both 
advances in how conservators work and think, but also a great deal of uncertainty with 
regards to the ethical and technical boundaries that, in turn, define a conservator’s identity 
and role. 
This creative ambivalence in positioning the practice has been and will be expressed, and 
partially relieved, through critical debate and technical challenges, with their attendant 
compromises and resolutions. To varying degrees, such struggles and resolves is what 
defines and redefines the core concepts and principles of conservation along with its 
priorities. The chapter concludes by conjuring a foundation and cornerstone for modern 
conservation practices, plagued as they are by shifting grounds, in an underlying 
fundamental premise that conservators believe in and operate upon: the necessity and 
goodness in preserving the material past.  
It is the status of this largely unchallenged premise that was examined and questioned in 
the second chapter: preservation is a fundamentally worthwhile and desirable mission, as 
it was formulated when this idiom first started to take on self-evident forms. After 
analyzing the formation process of a discourse on preservation, I argued that the accepted 
virtues of preservation, in keeping and keeping up with our material past, should not be 
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understood as given, but that they emerged as an effect of the production, dissemination 
and enforcement of a modern concept of preservation put forwarded by the theories of 
evolution and thermodynamics during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Therefore, the emergence of conservation as a scientifically grounded discipline of 
historical guardianship anchored in a material past was contingent upon the particular 
discursive formation of preservation in the vast empire of late Victorian Britain. In this 
regard, I find recent efforts to introduce and incorporate other perspectives on 
preservation, including those of native and indigenous peoples from other parts of the 
world, valuable contributions to widen the cultural stakes in what this central term and 
operative principle circumscribes.  
Finally in the third chapter, the notion of conservation as a technology to accomplish 
preservation was explored. An account of various investigations into the application and 
mechanisms of decay was presented, and the will to manage decay in conservation was 
explored. The control of decay as an enhancement technology was further discussed in 
relation to the modern “drive to mastery,” an approach where the world is to be 
manipulated for human ends. Thus, I argued that conservation has evolved not only as a 
specialized discipline, but has also taken on a form of life, which has permeated our 
everyday life. 
One of the aims in the introduction was to look for responses to a specific question: how 
has conservation arrived at where it is now? The question was pertinent to a sentiment 
shared by many contemporary conservation professionals, who find themselves active in a 
field that has arguably reached a “juncture of impasses.” But such an introspective and at 
times paralyzing frame of mind is ultimately about seeking a course out of the juncture. In 
this regard, my approach to investigate the discursive formation and practice of 
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conservation was, first and foremost, an attempt to move the locus of discussion in 
conservation studies away from the well-defined and routine territories of ethics, 
organization principles and decision-making processes.  
By employing discursive analysis as a method of approach, this thesis focused on the 
patterns of how our knowledge of conservation is produced, disseminated and legitimized 
by ongoing contests in a plethora of other discursive practices, all intricately related to 
form a vast discursive complex. What has hopefully been accomplished through this 
process is an enhanced perception that enables us to better diagnose current practices of 
conservation in view of what they seek and desire to be, not merely as incomplete and 
imperfect deviations from an ideal one. This perspective also provides a crucial outlook to 
other views and practices that inform the material flows in our everyday ebb between past 
and present. Thus, the central conflicts or dilemmas in conservation can, and perhaps 
should be, discussed in relation to, for instance, problems of identity and representation as 
they pertain to the persisting core of preservation. Born with the heat engine and bred 
under thermodynamics during the industrial revolution, the worthwhile and noble idea of 
preservation has not been running out of steam since. Its language and its technologies, 
finally so comforting to the human condition, has naturally pervaded modern lives and 
societies to the extent that, to paraphrase a famous speech, we are all conservators. 
What cannot be accomplished through discursive analysis, what this study cannot deliver, 
are concrete solutions or objective causes to the problems and effects that are recognized 
here and elsewhere in conservation studies. Instead, the thesis looked at the underlying 
structure of a discourse leading toward conservation and asked an interconnected series of 
questions: who are the players, what are their intentions, how do they practice and what 
elements are in play. These frames of reference dotted with an ending question mark have 
the potential to provide some valuable insights into conservation as a specific discipline 
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and track the influences flowing in and out of the delimiting yet elastic sphere in which it 
operates.  
To briefly recall one such example of an influential rupture: during the discursive 
formation of conservation in the second half of the nineteenth century in Britain, it became 
evident that there were repeated patterns of using the new language of thermodynamics in 
established fields such as theology, social prophecy, literature and popular culture. 
Through this dissemination, the idea and knowledge of preservation gained traction and 
was amplified across the entire fabric of Victorian society in distinct yet related forms: the 
care of historic buildings, housekeeping techniques, sanitation reforms, even as a 
justification for imperial expansion in the self-appointed role as global caretaker. 
However, this familiar heritage does not mean that preservation holds the same golden 
currency in our time. A technical knowledge of preservation was deeply desirable to the 
late Victorians because there was also a ubiquitous understanding and fear among them 
that a dynamic heat engine would eventually die, catastrophically and prematurely, if left 
without competent maintenance. 
Today, the knowledge of preservation is equally pursued in different contexts and with 
varying motivations. But not only have those governing concerns that are shared across 
society changed, the available technologies of preservation have of course been radically 
updated. Our most urgent and debated issues today are perhaps also introducing 
sustainability with regards to anxieties about economies and the environment. This is a 
subtle shift in terminology where preservation, and by extension conservation, still holds a 
huge stake. Within this subtle transference, however, there may also be a crucial hint at the 
absolutely insurmountable collections and archives currently being assembled under the 
past domain. Digital technologies and services have brought about new and incredibly 
easy ways to preserve and present with a single, instantaneous, automatic click. 
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Everyone’s primal impulse across online social networks like Facebook and Instagram, 
with its stream of photographs captured by mobile devices on the go and presented as 
posters for posterity impossibly close to the present, seems to be throwing huge mountains 
of coal at the Victorian heat engine, at an unprecedented and accelerating rate. We now 
frantically consume in order to preserve. 
This is why the notion of conservation as a plural, gathering technology becomes 
increasingly important. It not only enables us to approach the ontology of conservation; it 
poses at every juncture those haunting questions about how and why we, as individuals 
and as a society, singlehandedly and collectively, now preserve and conserve to the 
astonishing extent that we do and have been enabled to. It equally asks all those principles 
and guidelines, methods and ethics, all the stamps of approval greeted with an affirmative 
nod in a professional conservation discipline, to justify their very existence. By expanding 
this ethos to approach the rising problem of and desire for sustainability in a hypothetical 
future where the dust has settled onto the immense amount of immaterial and material 
objects, digital and otherwise, that face the conservators of that day and age, it 
paradoxically becomes clear that lingering questions of conservation as technology can 
not be thrown away but must be, as they are, preserved. 
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